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Abstract
The literature on autonomous public agencies often
adopts a top-down approach, focusing on the means with
which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This
article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms
in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical
accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability,
denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain
substantive decisions to a parent department perceived
to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evalu-
ate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of
agency-CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a
survey in seven countries combining insights from public
administration and psychology. Our bottom-up perspec-
tive reveals close connections between de facto control
practices rather than formal institutional characteristics
and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend
that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning account-
ability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.
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The disaggregation of the state into a plethora of quasi-autonomous arm's-length agencies rep-
resents a core element of the transition from “government to governance” (Dommett &
MacCarthaigh, 2016; Pierre & Peters, 2020). This is reflected in the literature on the
“unbundling” (Pollitt & Talbot, 2004) and “unraveling” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003) of the central
state. The extending “chain of delegation” between central governments and the quasi-
autonomous agencies that deliver public services, regulate certain sectors or make critical
decisions about the distribution of public resources, has generated an extensive subfield of
scholarship on accountability and control in public administration and political science
(Bovens, Schillemans, & Goodin, 2014; Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Dubnick & Romzek, 1993;
Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, Lægreid, & Van Thiel, 2012).
A major gap in the existing research base can be identified in understanding how institu-
tional design and control are actually perceived on an individual level by key decision-makers in
agencies in public administration (Olsen, 2013; Romzek, LeRoux, & Blackmar, 2012). Very few
studies have opened the lid on the black box of unbundled governance in ways that unite “gov-
ernance as theory” and “governance as practice” (Chhotray & Stoker, 2008). Most studies in
public administration and political science start off from a top-down perspective and focus on
the control-problems faced by politicians and government departments (Brehm & Gates, 1999;
Verhoest et al., 2012). Very few studies have examined how the leadership of agencies actually
perceive and experience those attempts. Yet, such a bottom-up perspective is crucial if we are to
understand the impact of the institutional environment on their decisions and behaviors in
practice.
This article seeks to address this gap in the existing research base through a focus on the
perception of hierarchical accountability by the chief executive officers (CEOs) of quasi-
autonomous agencies. We combine theories and insights from public administration and psy-
chological research on control and accountability. We focus on felt accountability which is “a
natural bridging construct between the individual and institutional levels of analysis” (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999:256). Felt accountability denotes the expectation that one's decisions and behav-
iors will be evaluated (Hall, Frink, & Buckley, 2017; Hochwarter et al., 2007) by an “able”
(Mulgan, 2003) accountability forum with authority (Simon, 1997). Felt accountability has been
translated to public administration research from psychology, where its effects on individual
decisions and behaviors have been studied in hundreds of experimental studies.1 Individually
felt accountability is conceived as a response to the accountability environment in which the
individual operates (Hall, Bowen, Ferris, Royle, & Fitzgibbons, 2007).
The research question is: “what are the institutional antecedents of CEOs” felt accountabil-
ity? This question is relevant from a public administration and political science perspective, as
much has been written about the design and control of agencies. Some scholars have focused
on the appropriate institutional design of agencies while others believe de facto control prac-
tices are more important. Divergent factors such as formal legal status, organizational auton-
omy, the use of sanctions, monitoring or (in)formal contacts have all been noted as important
(Bertelli, 2006; Koop, 2014; Van Slyke, 2006; Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011; Verhoest, Peters,
Bouckaert, & Verschuere, 2004) and little is known about which of these factors has the stron-
gest impact. We study these factors as potential institutional antecedents of felt accountability
of agency-CEO's. This is also relevant in light of psychological research, as the (institutional)
antecedents of felt accountability are under-explored (Hall et al., 2017).
Our analysis is based on survey data (N = 498; response rate 45%) from the CEO's of (semi-)
autonomous agencies in seven countries: Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway,
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Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. The article is not comparative but focuses on similarities found
across those countries.
As great expectations regarding public sector agencies often remain elusive (Overman,
2016), our findings on felt accountability matter for a number of reasons. First of all, the find-
ings provide an insight into CEO's perceptions and feelings in relation to their direct principals,
offering important theoretical clues on what dimensions of their institutional context really
matter to them. Secondly, our results also have immediate policy implications for the design
and governance of agencies (Verhoest et al., 2012). Finally, by combining insights from psychol-
ogy with those from public administration and political science, we contribute to the expanding
new literatures on individual behaviors in public administration (Battaglio Jr et al., 2019),
focusing particularly on behavioral responses to accountability (Schillemans, 2016).
The article will first develop the concept of felt accountability (dependent variable), followed
by the institutional antecedents (independent variables) used in this study. After the methods
section, the article will discuss the results, including both full and partial confirmations of
expectations as well as some surprises. These results will be discussed in the discussion section.
1 | FELT ACCOUNTABILITY
In public administration studies of accountability, the complexity and multiplicity of the con-
cept (Bovens et al., 2014; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987), in combination with its missing, contradic-
tory or even perverse effects (Halachmi, 2014; Koppell, 2005), often take central stage.
Notwithstanding the notorious complexity, authors signal the rise of a “minimal conceptual
consensus” (Bovens et al., 2014:6). Key to this is the relational nature of the concept—some
actor is accountable to some forum, principal or audience—and the expectation of answerabil-
ity. Accountability is furthermore also consequential; the actors' conduct or behavior is evalu-
ated and sanctions and rewards may be used. These elements of the minimal conceptual
consensus are consistent with most important typologies and definitions in different disciplines
(Ferris, Rosen, & Barnum, 1995; Hall et al., 2007; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Mulgan, 2003;
Olsen, 2013; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987).
In psychology, accountability is seen as a crucial “bridging mechanism” that links individ-
ual behaviors to social and institutional contexts (Hall et al., 2017). Much of this literature is
based upon or inspired by Tetlock's social contingency model which “encourages communica-
tions” (1992:331) between individual-level behavioral research and scholars in for instance
organization- or political science. The social contingency model assumes that people are con-
cerned with their image, social status and power position. As a result, their responses to
accountability are driven by their attempts to enhance or protect their social standing vis-à-vis
important “others”. This aligns with recent studies in public administration on the reputational
bases of accountability (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016).
Tetlock (1992) identifies three individual coping strategies in response to accountability,
depending on how accountability is enacted. Decision-makers as “intuitive politicians” will first
of all try to please their accountability forums when this is possible. They will then shift their
position and subscribe to the forum's view on the issue (acceptability heuristic). When they are
held accountable for past events, however, they are likely to resort to defensive bolstering in
which they rationalize past behaviors and self-justify. The third coping strategy is pre-emptive
self-criticism. The latter option is theoretically superior in lieu of the quality of decision-making
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(Tetlock, 1983), yet requires high levels of cognitive effort which individuals will only choose to
invest when they feel they have to.
Crucially, the social contingency model assumes that accountability is a state of mind rather
than a state of affairs (Tetlock, 1992). That is, what matters is how accountability is perceived
by the individual, rather than its formal, objective characteristics (Ferris et al., 1995). We there-
fore study the individual's felt accountability (Frink & Klimoski, 1998; Hall et al., 2017), which
is defined as:
“The 1) implicit or explicit expectation that one's decisions or actions will be subject to
evaluation by 2) some salient audience(s) with the belief that there exists the potential
for one to receive either rewards or sanctions based on this expected evaluation.”
(Hochwarter et al., 2007: 227, emphasis added).
This definition combines the expectation of accountability with the salience2 of, in our
words, the accountability forum, which should be capable of evaluation (Hall et al., 2007; Hall,
Frink, & Buckley, 2017b). Felt accountability thus consists of several dimensions. We will focus
on three: the expectation to be held accountable by a legitimate accountability forum with suffi-
cient expertise to evaluate.
Felt accountability first of all denotes “expected” accountability. The individual expects that
her decisions are likely to be scrutinized in the future which increases the efforts put into
decision-making and the extent to which the agent anticipates the viewpoints of her account-
ability forum. Lerner & Tetlock 1999: 257 discuss the different effects of pre-decisional
(expected) versus postdecisional (unexpected) accountability. Decision-makers who expect
accountability yet do not know the exact preferences of their forum are found to process more
information, reflect more broadly and thoroughly on their choices and take better-informed
decisions (Hall et al., 2017; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). They are likely to engage in pre-emptive
self-criticism. Expected accountability may also reduce decision biases that threaten to punctu-
ate the quality of decision making (Tetlock, 1983), although accountability is also sometimes
found to increase biases (Klimoski & Inks, 1990).3 Expected accountability denotes the anticipa-
tion of future accountability which aligns with recurring findings in public administration
research on the anticipation of accountability (Meijer, 2001; Papadopoulos, 2003:482).
When accountability comes as a surprise (postdecisional accountability) it typically prompts
defensive bolstering in which individuals rationalize their behavior and try to save their social
status (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). They self-justify rather than self-reflect and this may lead to
normatively more questionable responses, such as lying, but also perceptions of red tape
(Bozeman & Scott, 1996) or work overloads (Power, 2003).
The second dimension of felt accountability is the perceived salience of the accountability
forum which is implied in Hochwarter et al.'s (2007) definition. The ministry's salience is
dependent on its “sanctioned acceptance” (Simon, 1997). Without the CEO's (implicit) accep-
tance of authority, she is not likely to be influenced in the, from a top down perspective, desir-
able way. To be seen as an able accountability forum, the ministry should nurture the
impression of both its “authority of sanctions” and its “authority of ideas” (Simon, 1997, 187).
The authority of sanctions refers to the perceived legitimacy of accountability (Lerner &
Tetlock, 1999, 258). In line with Suchman (1995, 574) we understand legitimacy to be a “gener-
alized perception or assumption”, held, here, by the actor, that the accountability forum's scru-
tinizing role is “desirable, proper or appropriate” and in line with “norms” and “values” of the
democratic system. Legitimate authority requires input based on respect and bears the actor's
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“willingness to obey” (Simon, 1997, 180). This dimension is important, as “people's acceptance
of specific accountability measures and of accountability systems will also be influenced by the
historical credibility of accountability measures” (Bergsteiner, 2012, 454). The legitimacy of
accountability is specifically relevant in public administration settings where actors are
accountable to multiple accountability forums (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Olsen, 2013).
Thirdly, the “authority of ideas” refers to the perceived expertise of the accountability forum.
Do CEO's acknowledge the parent department's expertise to properly evaluate their decisions?
The perception of expertise is important as many agencies perform highly specialized tasks
(Maggetti & Ewert, 2018) and the delegation to agencies aggravates information asymmetries.
Expertise is also crucial for the effective use of authority so that one's “decisions will be
accepted as decisional premises by the other” (Simon, 1997:189). The forum's capacity to over-
see the agent and to prevent her from “shirking or sabotage” (Brehm & Gates, 1999) is a neces-
sary precondition for any accountability relationship to work (Strøm, 2000) and there is ample
evidence of failing accountability forums in public administration (Schillemans &
Busuioc, 2015). The capacity to monitor and evaluate requires knowledge, skills and abilities
(Bergsteiner, 2012, 455) and are crucial to accountability (Ferris et al., 1995).
Felt accountability, thus, denotes three related subconcepts of expected accountability to a
legitimate accountability forum with the expertise to appropriately evaluate the agent's behavior.
The felt relational accountability scale captures and further elaborates on these three dimen-
sions (Overman, Schillemans, & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2020; see also Appendix D). These sub-
dimensions do not necessarily add up or develop in line. One may expect accountability to a
forum with or without expertise and with or without legitimacy. And, obviously, a legitimate
forum with high expertise may nevertheless not be expected to demand any accountability at
all. The three dimensions are nevertheless related as they are constitutive parts of a successful
accountability alignment of agent to forum. When the CEO of the agency expects, accepts and
acknowledges her upward accountability to central government, her behavior can also be
expected to be aligned to the expectations of central government. Conversely, however, one
could expect that a setting of high expected accountability with low perceived legitimacy and
expertise could lead to the negative responses to accountability documented in the literature,
such as gaming, lying and obstruction (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Halachmi, 2014).
2 | INSTITUTIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF FELT
ACCOUNTABILITY
In psychological studies, the individual's felt accountability is understood as a response to her
accountability environment (Hall et al., 2007), although there will be differences between indi-
viduals in the same conditions (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). According to Hall et al. (2007, 2017),
accountability environments vary along four dimensions. Accountability source refers to what
we call the accountability forum: the person or institution to whom accountability is rendered.
In this study, the source of accountability studied is central government as the principal of the
CEO. Accountability focus is the extent to which individuals are held accountable for decision
processes or outcomes (not the object of this study). Accountability salience refers to whether
one is held accountable for important decisions or outcomes. We study the accountability of
CEO's for decisions regarding their organizations' most important task. This implies that we
study cases of high accountability salience. Finally, accountability intensity denotes the multi-
plicity of accountability sources. The four features of the accountability environment are seen
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as potential antecedents of felt accountability, yet they have not been modeled as such in exis-
ting studies (Hall et al., 2017:209).
We focus on the first element: the accountability source (or forum) as antecedent of felt
accountability. More specifically, we focus on crucial institutional features of the governance of
agencies in public administration which are expected to affect CEO's felt accountability. In the
literature on governmental control of agencies, a large number of factors have been identified
as relevant. Authors have for instance discussed the relevance of legal types (Bertelli, 2006),
dimensions of autonomy (Verhoest et al., 2004) patterns of interaction (Van Thiel, 2016),
exchange of information (Koop, 2014), and monitoring and sanctioning (Braithwaite, 1997). All
of these factors suggest an underlying logic of proximity, comparable to the idea of accountabil-
ity salience: when the agency is “closer” to its parent department, higher levels of felt account-
ability for CEOs can be expected. In those cases, parent departments are more present in the
professional life world of CEO's, triggering a higher sense of accountability. This proximity
however can materialize in different ways and revolves around the tension between formal
institutional design versus de facto inter-organizational interactions.
2.1 | Formal Institutional design versus de facto control practices
At a general level, central governments can use two generic strategies in their relations with
agencies. The first is formal institutional design of agencies. Central governments shape the
formal-structural conditions in which agencies operate. Laws, rules and regulations are the first
causes of individual perceptions of accountability (Ferris et al., 1995:187) and the degree of
power and control of the forum is one of the most critical external influences on agents
(Bergsteiner, 2012:451). Central governments construct specific legal-organizational types,
determine the levels of formal autonomy and assign and remove tasks. According to the struc-
tural perspective on governance (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006), such baseline formal dimen-
sions are crucial in shaping how agencies relate to central government. Existing studies show
how their formal legal status (Van Thiel, 2012) or autonomy (Carpenter, 2001) are crucial for
agencies. Such formal factors may affect the felt accountability of agency CEO's. The underlying
logic is that some agencies work closer to central government and have less autonomy in taking
policy or financial decisions than others. Formal constraints necessitate them to take their prin-
cipal into account when taking decisions and they, thus, feel more accountable.
A second general strategy refers to actual practices of control, such as contacts and the
exchange of information. Although formal, structural perspectives have been widely used and
developed in the literature, they have also been criticized because they are not always descrip-
tive of real relations in the public sector (Skelcher, 2010) or because central theoretical assump-
tions are not found to hold empirically (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). Alternative approaches
to the governance of agencies therefore focus on informal relations (Romzek et al., 2012), rela-
tional contracting (Bjurstrøm, 2020) or stewardship theory (Van Slyke, 2006). What those alter-
natives have in common, is that they assume that actual practices of interaction between
individuals from different organizations are more important than formal institutional settings.
This aligns with behavioral research suggesting that mechanisms of social control are more
important than formal institutional design in generating perceptions of accountability (Ferris
et al., 1995:187). De facto control and autonomy, as enacted in specific interactions between
both parties, are then more relevant than institutional designs. In this perspective, the CEO's
felt accountability is most likely to be shaped in face-to-face, enacted, formal but also informal,
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interactions (Romzek et al., 2012). More frequent interactions then lead to a higher salience of
the forum and additionally create social ties which lead to higher felt accountability. Interac-
tions may either refer to the exchange of information, formal and informal meetings as well as
the use of sanctions and rewards. The latter may come with relational costs, as will be subse-
quently explained.
2.2 | Six potential antecedents
Formal design and informal interactions are, although theoretically divergent, not mutually
exclusive strategies. De facto interactions are predicated on de jure rights, rules and regulations.
The potential institutional antecedents of felt accountability are, to varying degrees, marked by
both strategies. We identify six potential antecedents, ordered on a continuum starting with the
formal legal type of agencies—which is the exclusive product of formal-institutional design—
and ending with inter-organizational contacts, which have an (almost) exclusively de facto
character.
i. Organizational type is the most commonly identified structural characteristic of agencies
(Verhoest et al., 2012). In most countries, there are different legal types of agencies, character-
ized by their specific legal status and proximity to central government. Organizational type has
been found to be related to accountability Bertelli (2006). It can be expected that CEO's in more
“distant” types of agencies subsequently experience less felt accountability toward their parent
departments.
ii. Financial autonomy relates to the extent to which agencies can take specific financial
decisions themselves (Verhoest et al., 2004). For agencies, the financial dimension of autonomy
is crucial and, in combination with resources, important for their influence and power
(Meier (1980). Public Management reforms have often sought to increase the financial auton-
omy of agencies while simultaneously constraining their policy autonomy with quantitative tar-
gets (Pollitt, 2005). It could be assumed that financial autonomy also affects felt accountability,
in the sense that low financial autonomy leads to a stronger sense of felt accountability toward
parent departments on whom the agency is then more dependent for crucial financial
decisions.
iii. Policy autonomy is a second important institutional feature. Bureaucratic autonomy
refers to agencies being separated from the actors who control them and capable of “sustained
patterns of actions consistent with their own wishes” (Carpenter, 2001:14). This is related to
organizational type yet it is more fine-grained and also carries a clear informal dimension on
the basis of formal rights and regulations (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). Policy autonomy is
about the extent to which an agency is autonomous in making crucial policy decisions. One
could expect, everything else being equal, an inverse relationship between policy autonomy and
felt accountability, where increases in the one are mirrored by decreases in the other.
iv. Sanctions and rewards are crucial parts of the hierarchical relationship between depart-
ments and agencies. As principals, departments may sanction or reward (un)satisfactory perfor-
mance or decisions by agencies with various means, ranging from budgetary measures, the (re)
allocation of tasks, binding directives, dismissal or promotion. Sanctions are usually seen to
form a ladder, escalating from the “ability to shame” via “lighter weapons such as certificates or
formal (dis)approvals” to the “nuclear weapon of liquidation” (Hood, 2005:47). The possibility
and severity of sanctions are crucial in making individuals feel accountable to specific
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accountability “sources” (forums) in contexts of multiple accountability (Hall et al., 2007:408).
Sanctions are most important in situations characterized by ambiguity and operational auton-
omy (Ferris et al., 1995:181), as in our case of semi-autonomous agencies. The “sanctions lobby”
as Bergsteiner (2,102:294) nicely puts it, would claim that this is the most important element in
an accountability relationship. More specifically, we would expect that sanctions and rewards
are mainly positively related to the first subdimension of felt accountability: expected
accountability.
v. Reporting practices are further important parts of the glue connecting (quasi)autonomous
agencies to their parent departments. Agencies report in a multitude of ways, ranging from
evaluations to annual reports, letters, external audits and informal talks. Much of this reporting
is mandatory although scholars have also found high levels of voluntary reporting by agencies
(Koop, 2014). Intense performance monitoring is an important management tool and conveys
important signals as to what goals or actions are seen as important. Intense reporting practices
can thus be expected to lead to higher levels of felt accountability by CEO's (Ferris
et al., 1995, 183–4).
vi. Inter-organizational contacts between parent departments and agencies may be important
to grease the wheels of collaboration. Agencies and parent departments are mutually dependent
and collaborate on a long term basis in a setting with formally shared goals but practically
diverging interests. A commonsensical adage to follow in this setting would be “Don't be a
stranger!”. Various scholars stake the claim that frequent (in)formal contacts lead to trust and
are imperative to proficient working relations between agencies and departments (Van
Slyke, 2006; Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011). High contact frequencies may be necessary “bonding
costs” (Van Thiel, 2016:48; Ferris et al., 1995) and higher contact frequencies can be expected to
be positively related to felt accountability.
2.3 | Negative feedback
The active use of monitoring and sanctioning may be conducive of organizational compliance
but the use of monitoring and sanctions may come with relational costs (Braithwaite, 1997).
Monitoring and sanctioning may have a negative impact on the subdimension of legitimacy,
as parent departments may be experienced to be over-demanding (Flinders & Tonkiss, 2016).
CEOs may find high levels of information-demanding by departments to be a nuisance and a
form of accountability overload (Halachmi, 2014) or audit explosion (Power, 2003). Behav-
ioral research suggests that “abusive supervision” (Hall et al., 2017:205) or “illegitimate
accountability” (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999:258) generates negative feedback. Higher levels of
monitoring and sanctioning could result in managers feeling that the expected accountability
is not at all legitimate, because the department could be seen to be micro-managing, even
meddling with, intra-organizational affairs (Greiling & Spraul, 2010). Constraining people
can lead to reactance (Ferris et al., 1995:184). Reactance is that individuals who feel that their
freedoms are threatened will be emotionally aroused to regain their former freedoms. On this
basis, the “motivation lobby” Bergsteiner (2012:294) champions empowering forms of
accountability rather than sanctions. We thus expect that active use of sanctions and rewards,
while likely to be positively related to expected accountability, is negatively related to the sub-
dimension of forum legitimacy. These are the relational costs of controlling behaviors
(Braithwaite, 1997).
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3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Case selection and sample
We studied felt accountability among CEO's of agencies in seven advanced democracies:
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. These coun-
tries have all gone through numerous reforms over the last decades, affecting the formal posi-
tion of agencies, systems of accountability and public sector management in general, although
with important national differences (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Verhoest et al., 2012). We
selected 1,096 agencies at the national level in those countries. These were all agencies that
carry out public tasks, but are not structurally a part of the parent department. We selected all
of the agencies that can be classified as an internally autonomous agency without legal person-
ality or as an autonomous agency with legal personality (cf. type 1 and 2 in the classification by
Van Thiel, 2012).
We circulated an invitation to take part in the electronic survey among the agency heads
between May and December 2017. We received a total of 661 responses, of which 496 were fully
completed. Additional data on the institutional relationship between agencies and parent
departments was collected from various external sources. This part of the data-collection was
finished in March 2018.4
Table 1 specifies the number of complete responses per country. In most countries, a
response rate of about 50% was achieved and there was an overall response rate of 45%.
In addressing the agencies, we used the strategy adopted by the earlier cost-cobra surveys
(Verhoest et al., 2012) and aimed for the CEO of an organization, indicating that some of the
descriptive parts of the survey could be delegated. Direct emails were used where possible, with
several follow up emails. In the UK (but also in Switzerland) we were unable to collect as many
direct email addresses as in the other countries, which probably explains some of the lower
response rates. The survey was translated to the various national languages, except for Switzer-
land where we used an English version. Approximately half of the items were derived from exis-
ting scales, which are available in all five languages (see Table 3 for sources). Other items,
including the felt accountability scale, were available in two languages and had to be translated
three times. This was coordinated by the bilingual PI and RA and was performed and tested by
the country teams.
TABLE 1 Overview responses
Country Complete responses Total invitations Response rate
Australia 91 170 54%
Denmark 32 53 60%
Netherlands 56 105 53%
Norway 85 168 51%
Sweden 115 241 48%
Switzerland 49 116 42%
United Kingdom 68 243 28%
Total 496 1,096 45%
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3.2 | Variables
“Felt accountability” (DV) was measured with the Felt Accountability Scale (see Appendix B).
The scale has been validated and has now been applied in 19 different populations of civil ser-
vants, including the seven for this survey. Items and the reliability of the scales are listed in
Table 2.
Organizational type was coded on the basis of the typology developed by Van Thiel (2012)
by experts from the seven countries on the basis of public records and available databases of
agencies. We focused on (a) semi-autonomous agencies without legal entity, and (b) statutory
bodies or agencies with a public legal entity.
Financial autonomy was measured on a three-item scale, which measured whether the
agency is mandated to take financial loans, shift between its budgets for personnel and running
costs, and shift between budgets over multiple years. Together, these items formed an adequate
scale (α = .65).
Policy autonomy was measured on a five-item scale, which measured whether agencies had
autonomy to set overall goals, identify target groups, choose between policy instruments, pub-
licly communicate about the policy, and prioritize tasks. These items formed a reliable
scale (α = .76).
The credibility of sanctions and rewards was measured with a seven-item scale, identifying
the availability of seven different sanctions and rewards and the perceived likelihood of use.
These items formed a reliable scale (α = .77).
Reporting practices were measured with a five-item scale that tapped into the frequency
with which the parent department receives particular types of information relating to the
agency's self-identified most important task. The items correlate and form an adequate
scale (α = .68).
Contact frequency was measured with a four-item scale measuring frequency of formal and
informal contacts on different hierarchical levels. Answers formed a reliable scale (α = .86).
We added control variables, both on the organizational level as well as on the individual
level, on the basis of available public records in the seven countries, websites, annual reports,
TABLE 2 Felt accountability items
Expected accountability
(Spearman Brown = .70)
I am held very accountable for our most important task.
The parent department holds me accountable for all of my decisions.
Forum legitimacy
(α = .65)
When the parent department changes its views we just have to comply with
this new reality.
It is a good thing, that we are ultimately accountable to the parent
department.
I am willing to work in the interest of the parent department.
Forum expertise (α = .76) The parent department applies clear / understandable standards to evaluate
our most important policy.
The parent department provides constructive feedback on our work.
Opinions from the parent department are generally unambiguous.
The parent department has sufficient substantive or technical expertise about
our work to oversee / evaluate our duties.
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and existing databases. Data collection was coordinated by the PI yet performed in collabora-
tion with academic experts on agencies and accountability in all seven countries.
• Organizational size. We used numbers of FTE's as a measure for size and coded this from var-
ious sources.
• Policy field. This was coded on the basis of websites and policy documents on the 10 interna-
tional COFOG-criteria used to classify governmental functions.
• Location of main office, in either the (political) capital or elsewhere (peripheral).
• Length of tenure. Respondents were asked to indicate the number of years they had worked
for the agency (or a predecessor).
• Country. We used the seven countries in our analysis.
Appendix A presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. Table B1 provides further
analyses.
3.3 | Analysis
We conducted a regression analysis on all three dimensions of felt accountability. To deal with
potential heteroskedasticity or influential cases, robust standard errors were estimated (Cribari-
Neto & da Silva, 2011). We used a fixed effects model to control for the country differences. All
analyses were conducted in R 3.4.3 using the sandwich 2.3–4 package for the estimation of
robust standard errors (Zeileis, 2006), and the qvcalc 0.9–1 package for the calculation of quasi-
variances to estimate country contrasts (Firth, 2003).
We controlled for common method bias which was necessary as several of our independent
variables have been collected in the same survey. A statistical control was applied to reduce the
risk of overestimated effect sizes. We conducted Harman's single factor test (Harman, 1976).
This test is an exploratory factor analysis of all relevant variables from the same source. If,
based on the eigenvalues, a single factor emerges, or if one factor captures more than 50% of
the variance, this is an indication that common method bias is present. All of our models had
three eigenvalues greater than one, and the proportion explained variance of the largest factor
varied between 22.2% and 26.4%, which is well under the cut-off value of 50%. Therefore, com-
mon method bias is not likely to be influencing our results. In addition, as we are measuring
attitudes and perceptions, the risk of common method bias might also be smaller than for
research on other organizational aspects such as performance (Favero & Bullock, 2015).
4 | RESULTS: UNPACKING FELT ACCOUNTABILITY
4.1 | Felt Accountability: expectation, legitimacy, expertise
CEO's of autonomous agencies face a double bind. They are expected to focus more strongly on
their own organization's performance and also on what societal stakeholders expect, yet they
are simultaneously bound to their parent departments for political directives, legal status, and
resources (Pollitt, 2005). Critics have been concerned that CEO's may turn their backs on their
parent departments and wrestle free from central control. Our results now suggest that this con-
cern is not generally warranted: the CEO's in our sample can be said to feel fairly accountable
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in relation to their parent departments on all three dimensions of felt accountability. Responses
vary on the three subdimensions, across the countries and also between individual respondents
(see the Appendix for details).
The expectation of accountability is most pronounced among our respondents (M = 5,73,
scale 1–7), signifying that CEO's of autonomous agencies are still more like “close neighbors”
than “distant friends” to their parent departments (Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011). This holds for
the agencies in all seven countries, yet to varying degrees. This expected accountability is
deemed to be quite legitimate by the respondents (M = 5,13), although the average answer is
now more moderated. Accountability is thus a little more expected than that it is considered to
be legitimate. When we move from the normative dimension of legitimacy to the cognitive
dimension of perceived expertise, the mean response again drops a bit. The expertise of the par-
ent department as accountability forum is the relatively weakest element in the perceptions of
our respondents, and the mean is not much above the neutral response (M = 4,61).
We thus see relatively high levels of expected accountability to parent departments who are
not always seen as legitimate, and even less often deemed to have proficient expertise. For
policy-makers in parent-departments, the first takeaway, then, is that they should focus on how
their expertise is perceived if they would want to increase felt accountability among CEO's. This
is particularly relevant, as some of the policies are explicitly delegated to those agencies in order
to cluster expertise (Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011) and the delegation process widens the
knowledge gap.
4.2 | Institutional antecedents of felt accountability
When CEOs feel more accountable toward their parent departments as legitimate principals
with sufficient expertise, it is more likely that they will be more responsive toward the govern-
ments' policies and that the actions of their organizations are aligned with central governmental
expectations. Felt accountability and its subdimensions are undoubtedly in part dependent on
individual characteristics, but this is not part of this study. We also see some significant differ-
ences between the countries in our data, suggesting the relevance of cultural and systemic dif-
ferences (see Appendix A). Beyond that, however, our analysis suggests there are robust
relations between some of the institutional variables identified and (subdimensions of) felt
accountability. Table 3 below displays the results on the institutional antecedents of felt
accountability at a glance.
4.3 | De facto control: some strong findings
As Table 3 shows, our analysis suggests that higher reporting frequencies and a higher credibil-
ity of sanctions and rewards are both strongly related to all three dimensions of felt accountabil-
ity. CEO's who report more often to their principal and consider it more likely that sanctions
and rewards will be used, do expect to be accountable to their parent departments and also find
this more salient in terms of legitimacy and expertise. Also, as will be discussed later, we did
not find negative effects of sanctions and rewards on forum legitimacy, as was expected.
The most direct and straightforward interpretation of this finding would be that, contrary to
some expectations in the literature, hierarchy may actually work and be relevant, even in times
of more fragmented governance (Bergsteiner 2012; Pierre & Peters, 2020). In the control
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perspective embodied in principal-agent theory, monitoring and sanctioning stand out as key
tools with which to curb the asymmetries between principal and agent. Our results suggest that
CEO's feel more accountable to stronger principals who are more actively informed and may
more credibly retaliate or reward. This suggests that the role of hierarchical control, not only
practically but also in normative terms, may be reconsidered in the age of fragmented gover-
nance (Hill & Lynn, 2004; Jarvis, 2014).
There is however more to this, as the findings signify more than hierarchical control only.
Our measures include mandatory and voluntary reporting (cf Koop, 2014) and sanctions and
rewards. This suggests that the results are not only about enforcing control by central govern-
ment but also about the CEO expecting rewards for good performance and opening up volun-
tarily to provide even more information than is requested. Also, only a very limited number of
respondents indicate that sanctions are actually used (2,2–6,1%, depending on type). This is in
line with earlier studies suggesting sanctioning comes with relational costs as “big sticks
rebound” (Braithwaite, 1997). These findings do all in all suggest that it is important for govern-
ment departments to induce the suggestion that they will use their powers of coercion and
reward when this is necessary and appropriate, without necessarily using them.
An additional interpretation is that accountability serves more purposes than control only
(Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Dubnick & Romzek, 1993). Accountability can also be sense-giving
and suggestive of status, reputation and relevance (Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). By
TABLE 3 Regression analyses antecedents of felt accountability
Expected Accountability Forum Legitimacy Forum Expertise
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Organizational Type
(ref. Type 1)
Type 2 −0.882 0.589 −0.267 0.352 −0.241 0.458
Financial autonomy 0.250 0.147 0.221* 0.101 −0.085 0.126
Policy autonomy −0.158 0.080 −0.387* 0.069 −0.202* 0.082
Credible sanctions
and rewards
0.340* 0.116 0.648* 0.105 0.250* 0.117
Reporting practice 0.336* 0.136 0.293* 0.121 0.390* 0.134
Contact frequency 0.153 0.078 0.048 0.077 −0.034 0.076
Location Main Office −0.030 0.104 0.239 0.098 −0.019 0.107
Size −0.001 0.031 0.051 0.027 −0.032 0.031
Tenure 0.028 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012
Intercept 5.63* 0.788 4.249* 0.536 4.361* 0.688
ΔF country** 3.518* Δdf = 6 5.225* Δdf = 6 6.527* Δdf = 6
ΔF policy field** 1.474 Δdf = 9 2.403* Δdf = 9 0.942 Δdf = 9
F 5.055* df = 25; 430 11.18 df = 25; 442 3.888 df = 25; 443
R2 0.227 0.387 0.179
N 456 468 469
*p < .01. Estimations and robust standard errors.
**All analyses include country and COFOG-classification effects, which are omitted in the table and presented in
appendix if statistically significant. F-values based on ANOVA model comparison.
SCHILLEMANS ET AL. 13
demanding information and credibly signaling the intention to act upon it, parent departments
signal that they actually care about the agency and that its work is significant. Departments
then “convey social-relational signals to [agency] decision-makers” (Patil, Vieider, &
Tetlock, 2014:72) suggesting they really care about their decisions and will act when necessary.
4.4 | Organizational type and autonomy: mixed findings
As Table 3 suggests, more formal potential antecedents of felt accountability had only limited
and mixed effects on felt accountability.
On the on hand, the autonomy inherent in the legal status of the agency was not related to felt
accountability of CEOs in our sample. The legal type of an agency is the most fundamental formal
distinction between different agencies (Van Thiel, 2012) and is crucial in determining the boundaries
between central governments and agencies. The legal type is also important, as it is frequently the
object of administrative reform (Dommett and Maccarthaigh 2016). Governments tend to design
comparable governance regimes for agencies with the same legal status (Bertelli, 2006). However, as
important as legal status may be in many ways, it was not related to the felt accountability of CEO's.
On the other hand, policy autonomy—the ability to take substantive decisions on your own as
an agency—was negatively related to the perceived expertise and legitimacy of the parent depart-
ment while financial autonomy—the ability to take some financial decisions‑was found to have a
positive relation with forum legitimacy. When CEO's manage agencies with more policy auton-
omy, they react more negatively to upward accountability and find their hierarchical accountabil-
ity relationship to be less legitimate. They may possibly feel that they are being micro-managed
(Flinders & Tonkiss, 2016). CEO's of agencies with more financial autonomy find their account-
ability relationship with their parent department more legitimate. CEO's with a lot of financial
autonomy by and large accept the accountability relationship they experience with their direct
principal. It seems that financial autonomy may smoothen interactions between agencies and
departments while policy autonomy, to the contrary, makes their interactions more difficult.
Autonomy features prominently in the literature on autonomous agencies (Christensen &
Lægreid, 2006; Verhoest et al., 2004) and the design of appropriate formal rules and institutions
is important from a policy perspective. Its impact on felt accountability, though, is limited and
mostly related to the subdimension of legitimacy. Assuming felt accountability is desirable, our
findings suggest that agencies should have some financial autonomy yet less policy autonomy.
4.5 | No indications of relational benefits or negative feedback
Our expectations regarding relational benefits and negative feedback were not confirmed. To
begin with, we expected that warm and frequent interorganizational contacts would be condu-
cive of proficient working relations. High levels of contact are said to be necessary to grease the
wheels of cooperation between the two separate entities (Van Thiel & Yesilkagit, 2011). Fre-
quent contacts could thus be expected to have a positive effect on felt accountability. However,
as is clear in Table 3, we find no relations between contact frequency and felt accountability.
This would suggest that even though frequent contacts may be relevant as such, the other
dimensions have a much stronger effect on all dimensions of felt accountability.
Further, more frequent use of controlling measures such as sanctions and rewards could be
expected to incur negative feedback on these relationships and particularly affect the
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subdimension of legitimacy. Against the background of recurring criticisms of the audit society
(Power, 2003), and accountability overloads (Halachmi, 2014), high levels of reporting and
expected sanctioning could be expected to go hand in hand with much lower levels of forum
legitimacy. We find, however, that they are even positively related to the subdimension of
forum legitimacy. It seems that departments requesting more information and credibly signal-
ing that they will respond with sanctions or rewards, strengthen felt accountability and in this
process also build up their own legitimacy in the eyes of the CEOs.
5 | CONCLUSION AND REFLECTIONS
This article has set out to study how CEO's of (semi) autonomous agencies experience their
accountability relationship with central government. We adopted a bottom-up approach, focus-
ing on governance as practice rather than governance as theory (Chhotray & Stoker, 2008),
exploring how institutional design and de facto control are actually perceived on an individual
level (Olsen, 2013; Romzek et al., 2012). This article has gauged whether and when CEO's expect
to be held accountable for their decisions, experience this as legitimate and whether their princi-
pals are felt to have sufficient expertise to properly evaluate them. Among the institutional ante-
cedents of felt accountability two stand out: reporting practices and the credible use of
sanctions and rewards. An informed proximity by central government as accountability forum
that actually cares about what the agency does as an “exteriority within” (Wolters, 2019), and
the anticipation of positive or punitive consequences, helps to make CEO's of government agen-
cies feel more accountable.
This finding is of immediate relevance to public policy. The appropriate design and manage-
ment of autonomous agencies are the objects of recurring policy initiatives in many established
democracies, including the seven we studied for this article (Verhoest et al., 2012). Among the
antecedents of felt accountability we included formal and “hard” institutional factors, such as
the legal status of agencies, with “softer” yet, apparently crucial, de facto control practices. The
analysis suggests that the latter clearly have the strongest impact on the felt accountability of
CEO's. The policy implication is that policy-makers in central government would be well
advised to shift some of their attentions away from formal-legal aspects to the actual interaction
patterns with “their” agencies. They also need to assure that they have the necessary expertise
to evaluate with their agencies properly.
The major theoretical contribution this article makes is that it integrates insights on felt
accountability developed in psychology (Hochwarter et al., 2007; Hall et al., 2017) in the study
of governance as practice, in line with the recent development toward a behavioral public
administration (Battaglio Jr et al., 2019). This is relevant from the perspective of the psychologi-
cal literature on accountability, as there has been little research on the antecedents of felt
accountability and the role of the accountability audience (Hall et al., 2017). Also, by analyzing
agency CEO's in seven countries, we conducted a study with higher ecological validity which
was sensitive to national and cultural variations (Bergsteiner, 2012). By integrating micro-level
research from psychology in mesolevel studies of public administration, we shed light on how
and when salient institutional factors in governance affect key individuals in agencies.
The study of felt accountability on an individual level is important, as it has been related to
many salient aspects of individual decision-making in laboratory studies (Hall et al., 2017>;
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). In their review of that body of literature, Hall et al., 2017: 208) contend
that felt accountability may be “… the most pervasive (and perhaps even the most powerful)
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single influence on human social behavior”. This can be related to other “constructs of the
mind” in public administration, such as public service motivation (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007)
or emotional labor (Newman, Guy, & Mastracci, 2009). This is relevant if we are to understand
governance as practice and want to gauge how institutional settings affect important individual
decision-makers in public administration, whose behaviors and decisions have significant con-
sequences for society.
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ENDNOTES
1 See for reviews: Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Hall et al., 2017; Harari & Rudolph, 2017; Aleksovska, Schillemans, &
Grimmelikhuijsen, 2019.
2 In psychological studies, “salience” may refer to the audience to whom accountability is rendered (Hochwarter
et al., 2007:227; Ferris et al., 1995:186). But salience is also a dimension of the accountability environment.
Accountability salience then denotes that decisions taken by the individual are “related in important ways to
the overall effectiveness (or mission) of the group or organization” (Hall et al., 2007:408). We focus on the
salience of the accountability forum.
3 There are more studies reporting attenuation than increases of bias (Aleksovska et al., 2019 et al, fig. 7. Appen-
dix 3).
4 The dataset is available via https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/, DOI: 10.17026/dans-2ay-9avv.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Descriptive statistics and correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Expected
accountability
1.00
2. Forum
legitimacy
0.51* 1.00
3. Forum expertise 0.41* 0.45* 1.00
4. Organi-zational
typea
0.09 0.10 0.05 1.00
5. Policy autonomy −0.14* −0.32* −0.20* 0.03 1.00
6. Finan-cial
auto-nomy
0.18* 0.17* −0.04 0.20* 0.16* 1.00
7. Contact
frequency
0.18* 0.16* 0.11 −0.20* −0.10 0.04 1.00
8. Repor-ting
prac-tice
0.24* 0.24* 0.18* −0.16* −0.12* 0.13* 0.67* 1.00
9. Credible
sanctions
rewards
0.31* 0.48* 0.22* 0.06 −0.32* 0.13* 0.18* 0.21* 1.00
10. Loca-tionb −0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.07 −0.09 1.00
11. Size (log) 0.11 0.22* 0.11 −0.05 0.03 0.23* 0.35* 0.37* 0.23* 0.15* 1.00
12. Tenure 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.11 −0.10 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 1.00
N 473 490 491 541 526 522 504 509 495 542 537 489
M 5.73 5.13 4.61 4.15 2.01 1.78 1.21 1.94 4.64 6.60
SD 1.16 1.22 1.14 0.74 0.58 0.94 0.55 0.53 2.04 3.52
Range 1–7 1–7 1–6.75 0–1 1–5 1–3 0–5.30 0–3.47 1–3.43 0–1 0–9.96 1–11
Source FA Scale Van Thiel,
2012
Verhoest
et al.,
2012
Brandsma,
2010
Note: most items based on existing (validated) scales; sources provided here.
aOrganizational type: 0 = type 1 (28.9%), 1 = type 2 (70.8%).
bLocation: 0 = in capital (54.2%), 1 = outside capital (45.8%). For the Netherlands, the political capital is used
(the Hague) as the seat of the national government.
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APPENDIX B.
TABLE B1 Multilevel models
Expected Accountability Forum Legitimacy Forum Expertise
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE
Organizational Type (ref. Type 1)
Type 2 −0.712 0.096 −0.168 0.421 −0,305 0,484
Financial autonomy 0.125 0.327 0.196* 0.093 −0,151 0,107
Policy autonomy −0.089 0.013 −0.346* 0.068 −0,172* 0,078
Credible sanctions and rewards 0.315* 0.252 0.648* 0.101 0,254* 0,115
Reporting practice 0.357* 0.187 0.278* 0.117 0,383* 0,134
Contact frequency 0.099 0.148 0.029 0.067 −0,033 0,077
Location Main Office −0.038 0.450 0.193* 0.095 0,000 0,109
Size −0.001 0.204 0.054* 0.026 0,040 0,030
Tenure 0.030 0.185 0.015 0.013 0,013 0,015
COFOG classification
(ref. general public services)
Defense −0.275 0.171 −0.237 0.324 −0,046 0,372
Public order and safety 0.038 0.213 0.145 0.183 0,096 0,210
Economic affairs −0.070 0.096 −0.172 0.144 −0,146 0,165
Environmental protection −0.249 0.027 −0.018 0.250 0,249 0,286
Housing and community 0.084 0.013 0.396 0.410 0,556 0,471
Health −0.097 0.327 0.117 0.202 0,144 0,231
Recreation Culture Religion 0.270 0.187 0.395* 0.183 0,287 0,209
Education −0.350* 0.148 −0.008 0.168 −0,112 0,192
Social protection −0.101 0.252 0.165 0.210 0,052 0,241
Intercept 5.151* 0.603 3.96* 0.50 4.492* 0.690
Country variance 0.064 0.254 0.110 0.3320 0.112 0.334
Residual variance 0.864 0.929 0.853 0.924 1.128 1.062
N (organizations) 456 468 469
N (countries) 7 7 7
Note: hierarchical linear model with random intercepts (country). Estimates and robust standard errors.
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APPENDIX C: Country effects
Note: Estimations and 95% confidence intervals based on quasi standard errors (Firth, 2003).
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APPENDIX D: The Felt Accountability Scale
The concept
The concept of felt accountability has been developed in psychological studies and has been
used as dependent variable, independent variable or moderator in a large number of experimen-
tal studies (Aleksovska et al., 2019; Hall et al., 2017; Lerner & Tetlock 1999). Hochwarter
et al. (2007) have developed a measurement instrument which has been used in many of those
studies. The scale is useful and valid yet does not measure all dimensions of the overarching
concept (Hall et al., 2017), most notably dimensions relating to the salience of the relationship
to the “accountability forum”. Additionally, the instrument has not been used in public admin-
istration settings, where accountability relations are multidimensional (Bovens et al., 2014;
Koppell, 2005; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987) and “peculiar” (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973;
Waldo, 1948). Against this background, a measurement instrument was developed, using items
from the original Hochwarter scale in combination with new items for expertise and legitimacy
of accountability, to be applied in public administration settings. The validated felt relational
accountability measurement instrument was published in 2020 (Overman et al., 2020).
Procedure
The validated measurement was developed using commonly used recommendations in public
administration research (DeVellis, 2009; Hinkin, 1998). The questionnaire contains a limited
set of the original Hochwarter-items (which was established as a reliable scale with
Crohnbach's α = .73) in combination with items denoting forum expertise and forum
legitimacy.
A questionnaire containing the various items was administered to a total of two samples of
Dutch public sector employees (from five different types of organizations). The first study was
conducted among public sector employees effectively working below the national level in local
and regional governments (municipalities and provinces) as well as in the police in November
2016. We fielded a second wave among employees in the national government (ministries and
executive agencies) in February 2017. The first wave contains 1,983 responses (response rate:
36.3%), and the second wave contains 1,256 responses (response rate: 35.3%).
The measurement instrument was developed in a two-step strategy. First, the initial model
was calibrated to the data from the first sample. Calibration involves the adaptation of the ini-
tial model based on the data in the first sample (Kline, 2015). The second sample was used to
test and cross-validate the model to prevent overfitting or capitalizing on chance based on the
available data in the first sample (MacCallum, Roznowski, & Necowitz, 1992).
Dimensions
The validation procedure led to a scale with three reliable subdimensions: expected accountabil-
ity, forum legitimacy and forum expertise.
Expected accountability captures the original set of items on felt accountability and denotes
whether decision-makers expect to be held accountable for their decisions in the future
(Hochwarter et al., 2007).
Forum Legitimacy denotes whether the decision-maker finds it legitimate that (s)he will be
held accountable in the future by a designated accountability forum in the future.
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Forum Expertise finally denotes whether the decision-maker experiences that its account-
ability forum has the expertise to properly asses her decisions.
Applications
This scale has been applied in this study but also in three other empirical projects where the felt
accountability of decision-makers in organizations with (some) autonomy from central govern-
ment was measured: museums (Overman, 2020), transnational European organizations
(Schillemans & Kremers, 2020), and independent regulators (Schillemans, Bokhorst, van
Genugten, & Oude Vrielink, 2018). In all of these applications, the three items formed reliable
scales. As the table below shows, there was also meaningful variance, both across the samples as
well as between the three items of felt accountability. The means and N in red below are from this
article, the other three from the other empirical applications of the scale in other papers.
Felt Accountability Scale: Means comparison (n) across empirical applications.
Felt Accountability (items)
Agencies in
seven
countries
Transnational
organizations
Regulatory
agencies Museum
Expected accountability (Spearman Brown
reliability: .71)
5.73
(473)
2.67
(43)
4.78
(75)
5.15
(96)
(1) I am held very accountable for the most
important task.
(2) The actors hold me accountable for all of
my decisions.
Forum legitimacy (α = .65) 5.13
(490)
2.53
(43)
5.11
(75)
4.31
(97)
(3) When the actors change its views we just
have to comply with this new reality.
(4) It is a good thing, that we are ultimately
accountable to the actors.
(5) I am willing to work in the interest of the
actors.
Forum expertise (α = .76) 4.61
(491)
3.42
(43)
4.24
(75)
3.79
(97)
(6) The actors apply clear/understandable
standards to evaluate the most important
tasks.
(7) The parent department provides
constructive feedback on our work.
(8) Opinions from the actors are generally
unambiguous.
(9) The actors have sufficient substantive or
technical expertise about our work to
oversee /evaluate our duties.
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